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In the early 20m century, opposition to the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and
radical labor activismescalatedinto classviolence inEverett and Centraliabecause ofthepolarization
between the working class and business classes. class polarization resulted from 
the anti-union
fervor of local and state business and political leaders. In Everett this polarization heightened
working class solidarity but in centralia it revealed the extent to which the working class had
splintered. The differences between the two communities were caused by numerous 
local and
regional factors relating to unionism and political power. In both cases the 
persecution ofthe Iww
and their mernhrs, led to an escalation of actions and the increased the militancy ofthe 
wobblies,
(the nickname given to and accepted by IWW members). This conflict also showed 
the inability of
middle class progressives in both communities, to build stronger bridges both with 
the labor
movement and with the industrial capitalists to avert the tragedies. The opposition of 
most
industriarists to the rabor movement's radicars and moderates, including the washington 
state
Federation of Labor, its affiliates, and the Iww, should be emphasized. The open-shop drives 
of
employers and anti-radical hysteri4 intensified after the World War I' These two hostile movements'
were interrelated and held a commonality ofpurpose; to destroy the labor 
movement by persecuting
its more radical elements. They identified radicalism with labor's cause in 
general, thus trying to
divide the labor movement and decimate its public image.
The Setting.
In the late nineteenth century, industrial development in Western Washinglon 
accelerated'
The introduction railroads during the rgg0s, most notably the Northern Pacffic 
and the Great
Northern, stimulated the timber and other industries. Everett, washington 
originated as an industrial
town during the earry r g90s. rn rgg2,James Hin, owner of the Great Northern 
Railroad chose the
1
location of this future city on the peninsula just north of Port Gardner Bay on the east coast of 
the
puget Sound as the sea port for the Great Northern Rafuoad.r Everett began with heavy land
speculation and prospects of industrial greatness as investors learned that capitalist 
giants like James
Hill, Weyerhaeuser Company, and John D. Rockefeller would be investing in this project. 
These
capital interests made Everett a lumber mill town. It grew rapidly during the 1890s and early 1900s
reaching 30,000 inhabitants. Industrial infrastructure such as rail yards that fed the some 
forty lumber
mills likewise expanded by the turn ofthe century.2 with the combination ofnational capital and 
local
industrial capitalists such as Roland Hartley and David clougfu partners in the largest 
independent
lumber mill in the town, as stake holders, Everett entered the 20e century a clty dominated 
by a
powerful capitalist class much more connected and formidable than in centralia.
The Everett working class was composed ofimmigrants fromAsia, the Midwest, and 
western
Europe, including German and Scandinavian and Asian workers.3 Workers found 
employment in and
around Everett in the lumber mills, building trades, logging and on the railroads. 
Middle class Everett
citizens were somewhat squeezed between these two classes because oftheir small 
size in comparison
to the working class and lack ofpower relative to the industrialists. Nevertheless they 
contributed
substantially to the body politic and figured prominently in the progressive reform 
movement'
Towns that originated out of early land grant settlements from the 1850s, such 
as Centralia"
began to grow more substantially after the introduction of rail service to the area. 
The Northern
pacific Railroad inthe lgg0s chose the what would be the town of centralia as a division 
point were
train crews changed.a The area around centralia was primarily agricultural well 
into the 20t century'
Lewis county where centralia was a location ofearly organizing for Grangers 
during the 1870s and
1gggs and later in the early lg90s the Farmers' Alliance and Poputist Party 
gained an "enthusiastic
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following among Lewis County farmers."s By the turn ofthe century Centralia boasted a population
of 1,600 people and was the fastest growing town in Washington between 1900 and 1910'6
Centralia also began to develop industrially by the early 1900s. Local industrial giants like Francis
Hubbard operated coal mines, held large tracts oftirnberlands, controlled industrial infrastructure 
and
operated the largest lumber mill in Centralia through the ownership of the Eastern Railway and
Lumber Company. Centralia was also a central location for hiring and a recruitment point for 
men
to work in the loggrng camps in southwestern Washington. With these characteristics, Centralia
developed arigid class structure ofindustrialcapitalists, middle classprofessionals and smallbusiness
owners, and a working class well before World War I'
Everett and Centralia entered the 20s century as class stratified communities. Everett had
started in a more industrialized region and seemed to accept class and class conflict as a reality'
Centralia still held elements of an agrarian communal heritage in some respects. while the 
tirnber
industry certainly changed the ecological, economic, and socio-political landscape, agrarian 
virtues
and farm or gantztngnoted above and below still figured prominently in Lewis County, 
including the
area surrounding centralia and Chehalis. While the conflict that would erupt in Everett 
in 1916 and
in Centralia in l919 originated labor-industrial conflicts, in the Centralia case the farmer 
movement
is significant not because of its role in the tragedies but for its similarities with the labor 
movement
and the extent to which both movements were repressed by town elites'
A Region in Social and Economic Turmoil
Between 1900 and World War I, several sometimes conflicting social movements rocked 
the
pacific Northwest. western washington was a focal point and dominant area of activity for
organzndlabor, radicalism and progressive reform movements in the Pacific 
Northwest throughout
J
the early 20e century. All of these movements reached a flash point when labor upheaval 
and
radicalism seemingly threatened the capitalist order'
While the majority of workers inthe United States including the Pacffic Northwest, 
did not
belong to a union during the early 20e century, in a rapidly industrializing 
region like western
Washington, an incalculable nrrnber ofworkers were exposed to or affected 
by strikes' slowdowns'
and other types of work-site actions. Many unions knew that they had 
to adapt to facilitate the tide
of action chosen by workers, who could radic alizevery quickly, depending 
on the conditions around
them. The study ofhow labor organizations like the washinglon state Federation 
oflabor and the
Industrial workers of the world adapted to changing conditions in order to succeed 
in organizing
workers, offers historians greater insight into the world of the worker' The legacy 
of reformism
within the labor movement in washinglon state can be traced back to 
the eady days of the Knights
of Labor organizing. The rabor movement, however, contained aradicalelement 
as well. At times
the radical and reform blocks within the labor movement sometimes 
collided because of differences
in terms of tactics and ideologies'
The organizations that dominated the state's labor movement in the 
early 1900s were the
washington state Federation oflabor (wSFL), the Industrial workers ofthe 
world (Iww), and the
socialist party. The IWW and the wsFL were very distinct in terms of 
ideologies and tactics' The
wsFL, which originally was the washington State Labor council, began 
its life unatrliated with the
American Federation of Labor (AFL).' It wrestled \Mith the question of affiliation 
for some time'
craft union conservatives favored affiliation, while industrial unionists 
balked at the proposal citing
samual Gompers membership in the National civic Federation as a 
negative.s The socialist Party at
this time favored a strategy of 
..boring from within" the AFL at both the state and national level in
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order to transform the Federation. The Socialists were also split between 'yellows' 
who favored
reform strategies and 
.reds' who preferred industrial unionism and indepurdent political action' By
lglz,the reds controlled the party and pushed for a more radicat direction within the Seattle Central
Labor Council and the ySFL. Socialists were strongest in the industrial unions, and by 1912, they
had reached the height of their power within the AFL and the wSFL.e When the WSFL 
finally
affiliated with the AFL sometime between I 903 and I 905, this debate between conservative 
reformers
and radicals continued.
The IWW claimed a departure, in many ways, from traditional craft unionisnr, and 
from the
reform strategies of the AFL. on organizational grounds, wsFL radicals and wobblies supported
industrial unionism. However, the IWW favored revolutionary unionismthat sought 
the immediate
destruction of capitalism in contrast to the accommodation strategies for which 
they criticized the
AFL and wsFL. The AFL and IWWs opposing views on political action frequently became 
hostile'
Because a high percentage of its members were migratory workers, the IWW had 
less faith in
political actioq however, in places like Butte, Montana, Wobbly voter turnout was a significant
reason for socialist success in local elections. For this reasonthe IWW could 
be characterized as not
anti'political but nsn'political- 
r0
The IWW had an exaggerated reputation for engaging in violent acts. Critics of the
organization frequently pointed out that the IWW constitution advocated sabotage. 
However, most
wobblies argued that sabotage could mean fluuly things including work actions 
like striking on the
job (slow downs), or workers following rules and guidelines so literally that it hampered 
production
or services.u Early on the IWW rejected tlp use ofviolence. In lg07 ,the official organ 
ofthe Iw.w,
The Industrial Worper,stated that there was no place for violence within 
the organization. According
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to the IWW, the new society it envisioned would come about through the use of the general strike.
Thiswouldonlyhappenthroughunionorganization,notorganizedrevolutionaryviolence. 
TheIWW
tried its best to portray the industrial landscape ofpeaceful workers and violent employers. 
Through
free speech fights like the one in Spokane in 1909, and large strikes like the one in Lawrence,
Massachusetts, the IWW gained the reputation of using nonviolent civil disobedience.l2 The 
IWW
struggled to define their public image but lost the battle to employers who portrayed the 
organization
as violent and dangerous.
Melvyn Dubfsky in his book, We Shall Be Atl and Joseph Conlin in his work' Bread and
Roses Too, both published n 1969, disagree on the point of whether or not the IWW was a
syndicalist organization.r3 Dubfsky and many other historians of the IWW agrce that it was an
American version of European syndicalisrn Conlia however, notes important differences 
between
Iww ideology and European syndicalism. The Iww for example, believed that dual unionismwas
a necessary evil in the united states because the AFL was too craft oriented, while 
syndicalism
rejected dual mernbership favoring instead a strategy of boring from within existing 
craft unions'
organizational structure was another major difference between the two ideologies. 
The IW"W was
a more centralized structure relative to the decentralized structure of European syndicalist 
unions'
Conlin,s discussion ofIWW ideology centers on his beliefthat the ideology of most Iww members
was industrialunionismratherthanthe abstract syndicalism. Inthis context, the differencesbetween
industrial unionists in the WSFL/AFL and the Iww were probably less dramatic than some scholars
such as Dubofsky have made them out to be. Because ofthe more thorough treatment 
conlin gives
to this subject, his interpretations are probably more accurate.
perhaps most significantly, the IWW and the AFL differed in their conception ofwhat a closed
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shop was and how it would come about. Melvyn Dubofsky, in his classic, We Sholl 
be All, stated
that he thought the Iww believed that 
o'collective action and voluntary cooperation by the exploited,
not capitalist concessions would bring the closed shop."ra This statement sluns up 
perhaps the main
difference between the IWW and the AFL. The IWW allusion to a working class organization 
where
cooperation is voluntary points out the lack ofjob consciousness or attachment to the 
job in the
Iww, something that was abundant in its competitor. This sense ofjob consciousness that the IWW
rejected and the AFL accepted, traced its origins to the early attempts of American 
workers trying
to organue into craft unions.l5
In the pacific Northwest lumber industry, mill workers were generally more 
job conscious
than loggers. The boom and bust cycles of the industry and the migratory tendencies 
of workers
proved early on that it would be extremely dfficult to organize workers in the timber industry' 
There
were also differences between mill workers and loggers. Their differences centered 
around the
differences between mill and logging work. Mill workers tended to remain in one 
location for longer
periods of time, allowing them to settle into communities. Loggers, by contrast, because 
of the
changing harvest sites were forced to migrate with the logging camps' In 
I 903, lumber mill workers
organized first meeting in Everett to form the International shingle weavers union.16 
Jonathan
Dembo in his work (Jntons and politics in washington state, 1885-1935, clntacteized 
these
workers as "Qonseryative, married church-going, home-owning men with a stake in their
communities.,, Dembo,s book onthe washington state labor movement cornbines 
an analysis ofthe
organizational history ofthe movement with some important insight into the 
social history ofworkers
in the state. There are similarities with his work and that of Carlos Schwantes, 
Radical Heritage,
which compared workers in British Columbia and washington state. Both 
historians concede that
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class consciousness and job-consciousness co-existed among workers' 
l7
After the Shingle Weavers' Union received their AFL charter in 1903, the AFL made several
unsuccessful attempts to oryanuean industrial union covering all workers in the mills and the logging
camps. The Shingle Weavers Union essentially gained jurisdiction over all mill workers, 
and it
remained perhaps the most successful and militant AFL union in the lumber industry for 
a number of
years. In Everett, where the Shingle Weavers' were especially strong, the conflict between 
the union
and the mill owners grew especially fierce dwing the recession of 1913-1915, and drning 
the strike
in 1916.
The IWW,s entry into the Pacific Northwest after its founding in 1905, appeared as a 
threat
early on to the ySFL and its affiliates.ls In the timber industry the IWW made several attempts 
to
organize tirnber workers in general and loggers in particular. The IWW tactics were 
more successful
than the WSFL in organizing migratory loggers who tended to be less 
job conscious than their
counterparts in the mills. The low dues and interchangeable memberships in Iww unions were
generally more attractive to loggers and other migratory workers. The Lumber Workers 
Industrial
Union, an IWW affiliate, and the International Union ofTimber Workers, a WSFL affiliate, 
competed
with each other for membership inthe logging camps of western washington from 
1905 through the
1917 timber strike.
Labor and Politics: Coalition with the Progressives'
Aside from organizing the work site, the WSFL attempted to build political coalitions 
such
as the Joint Legislative League with other reform organizations like the Grange 
and middle class,
progressive-reform groups. By lglzthis alliance was strong enough in the state legislature to win
the passage ofa limited workers compensation systemand eiglrt-hour day legislation 
covering women
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and minors.,, The success ofthis coalition, however, was questionable because it did 
not help labor
gain nearly as rnuch as it had hoped. and the alliances between the middle class progressives 
and
reformers in the WSFL was stressed by the changes encountered by each group.
The progressive movement pre-dominantly represented professional, middle 
class interests'
Its alliance with labor was fragile because ofthe diversity within its own ranks. 
The progressive mind-
set was predominantly a managerial-professional min&set and sought to reform 
the capitalist system
but without critiquing the systern The progressive movement was an attempt 
to search for order and
stability in a predatory capitalist system that in the so called Gilded age, 
fell short ofbourgeois values
ofrespectability and social cohesion. Instead ofclass struggle Progressives 
attempted to mediate or
head off industrial class disputes by forming joint-interest labor-management-government
organizations like the National civic Federation, as well as organizations at the 
state and local level'
In Everett for example, progressives organized the Commercial Club n l9l2 as joint organization
of mill owners, professionals, small businessmen, clergy and labor leaders'2o
Along with joint oryanzations, employers also began to organize as well' They formed
organizations such as the Employers Association of washington and an association 
of Lumber
manufacturers. These employer organizations were simultaneously inside 
and outside the progressive
movement. The West Coast Lurnbermen's Association launched open shop 
drives within their
industry to drive out unions. This contradiction between supporting an alliance 
with organized labor
in progress ive organizations while also attempting to break unions, doomed 
progressive efforts to
unite labor and caPital.
The formation of employer associations intent on crushing the labor movement 
and the
suspension of the reform program within the Republican Party illustrated 
that Progressivism had
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never completely won over capital irferests and its old Guard allies in the GoP. In 
washington
politics, progressivism remained a potent force especially at the local level but 
the recession and
world war I .tndermined the moral basis of progressiveness." The perception 
that the reform of
industriar capitarism courd come through rabor-management cooperation 
and the identification of
shared interclass interest.
Despite failures in the legislature, progressives won some victories 
at the local level lml9l2'
InEverett, that year, voters elected three Socialist city councilors and aprogressive 
Republican, R.
B. Hassell as rnayor. Hassell favored a single ta:r systern, municipal 
ownership of all utilities' a
commission form of government, and a tax on all corporations. These 
progressive reforms were
simlar to those advocated by local reformers across the country.2, 
while socialists onthe council,
including James solie, hadsomethingsincommonwithHassell, theyopposedhimonkeyissues 
such
as changing the city charter to create a commission form of town govemment' The form of
government was important to the Socialists because they were elected 
from city wards with working
class constituencies. A commission form of government would create at-large 
elections giving
middle class progressives the upper hand. To Hassell and the 
progressives, a commission government
would eliminate the inefficiencies and easy comrptibility ofward 
politics, and realize the managerial
ideal they desired.22 Some of the reforms proposed by the 
progressives and socialists on the city
council such as the tax on corporations, which failed by a one-vote 
margin, offended industrialists'
Other popular progressive reforms such as municipal ownership 
ofthe water systenr' the commission
government, singletaxanddirectlegislationpassedthecouncil.23 Whileprogressiveandlabor-reform
laws mostly bogged down in the legislature, Everett progressives 
achieved a high degree of success
during a time when expectations were high for a solid economy' 
unfortunately the economy took
l0
a disastrous turn bY 1913.
The lack of success in pushing labor-reform bills, direct legislation 
of the single tax proposed
tlrrough the legislatur e n l9l2-r913 disheartened reforrrrers in the wsFL and drove many of its
members in the more radical direction of the Iww and the socialist Pw.24 
An influx of new
immigrants into the wsFL frightened conservatives in affiriated craft unions 
who viewed them as
more susceptible to radicalism and IWW mernbership. Intervention 
by employer associations in
strikes, open shop drives and other attacks on labor increased 
during the recessionbetween 1912 and
lgl5.25
Everett: Prelude to TragedY, 1916'
During the recession years tensions between labor and the mill 
owners in Everett increased
armost to a boil over point. The west coast Lumbermen's Association 
defeated the AFL's
International union of Shingre weavers, Sawmill workers, and 
woodsmen, (ancestor ofthe IUTW,)
in 1913-1914, when union members struck for the eight-hour 
duy.'u The Lumbermen's Association
instituted the ten-ho,r work day andthe open slrop. By r915 
inEverett, the mill owners' almost all
of whom belonged to the Lurnbermen's Association or backed 
the open shop, cut wages for the mill
workers by 20 percent citing the fall in lurnber prices as their 
rationale.2T The shingle weavers'
union in Everett, and other locals in the Puget sound regioq launched 
an unsuccessful strike to
protest the wage cut. The rarge min owners in Everett, most notably cloug[-Hartley 
a'd
weyerhaeuser, nonetheless, promised to restore the wage 
scales to the I 9 14 level when the economy
recovered and lumber prices increased'
Byearly.to-midlgl6,theeconomywasbeginningtorecover,andlumberpricesbegantorise.
Throughout much of the state, shingle mills adjusted their 
wage scale to the level requested by the
l1
Shingle Weavers Union. The Everett mill owners, however, held out and forced a strike 
of mill
workers in early May, 1916. Before the strike, the union, guided by Ernest Marsh adopted 
a new
constitution. This created a more industrial union by admitting mill workers of 
other trades into its
ranks and encouraged greater working class solidarity. The union was rerulmed the 
Intemational
Shingle Weavers of America.2s
From its earlier days in the 1890s, when the Shingle Weavers' Union had embraced 
a more
decentralized structure and conservative tone, it gradually moved in a more radical 
direction' This
was likely due to the primitive organization and tactics ofthe lumber industry in 
Everett and western
washington in general. several lost strikes dwing this period radicalizedmill 
workers rather than
disheartening them. The International Shingle Weavers Union was radical 
and active enough at the
state rever to get one of its owrL Ernest Marstr, elected to the presidency of the 
wsFL in 1913. A
year earlier at the lglz,national AFL convention after forging ties with radical unions like 
the
western Federation of Miners, the Shingre weavers' joined with other "dissidents" 
to back a
Socialist, Mar Hayes, over Samuel Gompers for the Federation Presidency'2e 
The Shingle Weavers'
Union, the Everett Labor Council, which the union dominated, and the Socialist 
party had some
successes in Everett. They helped elect a clty council :rr_lgl2that was likely 
more pro-labor than
the previous councils and they had survived through employer attacks 
and a roller coaster economy'
But the Shingle Weavers, and the Everett Labor Council were frustrated 
with the broken promises
ofthe employers after the sacrifices they had made. Their decisionto strike 
again in 1916, choosing
the symbolic date ofMay I't to begin the walkout, crowned the shingle weavers' militant 
transition
which mirrored the same process that the wsFL was going through under Marsh's 
leadership.
On the other side, Everett mill owners, Roland Hartley, David Clougtr, 
and Fred Baker and
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national giant weyerhauser were still as stubborn as 
ever. Their return to the open shop drive during
the recession was well marked by the comment of one 
lurnberman, Edwin Ames, who stated in a
correspondence with Talbot, 
..Everett has been crassed as thoroughly unionized. It is about time' '
.that conditions are changed.,,3o The lurnbermen and 
mill ownOrs struggled to organize themselves
tl,oughout the earry 20s century. They recognized 
early on that ruinous cutthroat competition could
destroyallofthem. Everett milrownersheldconsiderablepower 
norgatnzrtionsliketheEmployers'
Association of washinglon and the west coast Lumbermen's 
Association. The Shingle Weavers'
Union was a thorn in their side for long enougtr, now 
in lgl6,they wanted to remove that thorn
permanentlY.
The Union initially was able to pull most ofEverett,s 
affected mill workers out on strike and
the action seemed to be successfur. In June another 
rabor dispute joined withthe shingle weavers'
Everett. In conjunction with a strike extending length 
ofthe west coast, the Puget Sound locals of
the pacific District of the International Longshoremen's 
Association (ILA), an AFL affiiate' went
out on strike on June 1,1. In Everett, the Riggers and 
stevedores Local 38-8 ofthe ILA joined the
strike shutting down the port.3r Despite their early success 
and the solidarity shown between the
Longshoremen and the mill workers, the Shingle 
Weavers' strike began to fail in the late summer
months of 1g16. The millowners imported professional 
strikebreakers as a part of their anti-union
approach to labor relations, and the mills again started 
to produce lumber'32 On August 19s'
picketers were attacked by a group of strikebreakers, 
provoking retaliation from a reinforced group
of union members who attacked the scabs as they 
reft the mill after work, causing the police to
intervene on the side of the strikebreakers'33
The IWW greeted the striking workers in Everett in 
late July. Earlier, the IWW had planned
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another major organizing drive of lumber workers in Western Washington' 
They saw Everett as a
key point in the northern Puget Sound region for organizing in the logging 
camps'34 As early as 1908'
the IWW lobbied the shingle weavers' unionto affiliate with them instead ofthe 
AFL. The Shingle
Weavers' , however, remained in the AFL, and the IWW instead 
concentrated on organizing migratory
workers. Historians seem to disagree why the Iww came to Everett in July 1916, and what 
their
motivations were. Did they come in to support the Shingle Weavers' as Norman 
Clark indicated'3s
or was the IWW also interested in attracting the striking workers to the 
fold of revolutionary
industrial unionism? Regardless oftheir original intentions, after arriving 
in Everett they saw the need
to support the striking mill workers, undoubtedly the Wobblies' strong 
sense of class consciousness
motivated them to do so regardless to which union they belonged to'
The free-speech fight in Everett began inadvertent$ with the arrival of 
an IWW organizer in
late July. on July 31't IWW organizer James Rowan arrived in Everett 
to survey the town and open
up shop. On his first night in town Rowan used a cofirmon tactic of 
wobblies when starting an
organizing drive, he got up on a soap box on wetmore Avenue and 
beganto speak about the IWW
in hope of attracting workers. He attracted quite a crowd including Jake 
Michel ofthe Everett Labor
Council. When Rowan spoke in a derogatory rumner criticizing the 
AFL, Michel spoke up against
Rowan,s claims. Not to far away the sheriffof snohomish county, 
Donald McRae, who used to be
a member of the Shingle weavers' union when he worked in the mills, 
listened in on the argument
then came up and offered to arrest Rowan for Michel. Michel turned 
him down claiming that Rowan
hadn,t said anything that would wanant his arrest but McRae arested 
him anyway' The next
morning the judge offered Rowan the choice of a thirty day 
jail sentence or leave town' Rowan chose
the later and left Everett to find a job in the logging crlmps to learn 
about the industry'36
t4
After the first debacle with the authorities, IWW organizer Levi Remiok 
opened an IWW hall
on Hewitt Ave. in Everett.3T Remick made plans for James Thompson, the 
famous Iww otganiz'er
who had red the Spokane free-speech fight in r 909, to come to a street 
meeting in Evere tt orthe 22d
of August. McRae who had left the hall alone since it had opened, 
stormed into the hall before the
22n threatening Remick and declared that the street meeting was 
canceled. The meeting, however,
went ahead as pranned. Thompson arrived in Everett on the z2n, andbegan 
the meeting, attracting
a rarge number of people. Fifteen porice officers intemrpted the meeting 
by arresting Thompson.
After he was pulled offthe stand, James Rowan, who had come back 
into town the night before' took
his place on the stand and then was arrested. Before the night was 
througll twenty-one people were
arrested, some ofwhorfl weren't wobblies, including tl,ee women 
(two were IWW mernbers') Jake
Michel, also was arrested for protesting the other arrests.3s That night 
over five hundred Everett
citizens protested outside the jail. McRae pulled Rowan out from the 
group and vowed to teach him
a lesson. He took him outside of town and dropped him offand told 
him to return to Seattle, Rowan
was then beaten by a mob that was waiting for him. Late4the IWW received 
a resolution of support
from the Everett Labor council backing the free-speech fight and condemning 
McRae. As the events
mentioned above illustrate, in its initial stages, the free-speech fight 
that the Iww did not originally
intend to create began to escalate beyond their control.
WhyMcRaetooksuchboldactionandwhoempoweredhimtocommitsuchactsisan
important question. Behind the violence of law enforcement lrras 
a directive fromthe commercial
crub. Since earry rgrl,independent mill owners, weyerhauser and 
GreatNorthernrepresentatives
completely dominated the commercial club. Middle class members resigned 
from the club after
abstaining on a vote to back the open shop drive. David clough 
ofthe commercial club argued that
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the presence of the Iww would prorong the strike. The commercial club obviously 
saw the Iww
as enough of a threat to warrant a campaign of intimidation and 
later a blockade of Everett from
intruding wobblies. Many of them remembered the spokane free-speech 
fight in 1909 and did not
want the same thing to happen in their backyard. The commerciar club 
approached the city
commissioners to help keep the Iww out ofEverett, but they turned clough dowrl 
citing that there
weren,t enough funds to conduct such a campaign. Clough and the 
Commercial Club next turned
to McRae who pledged that he could blockade the IWW fromthe 
ports of entry into Everett with
enough volunteer deputies.3e This was all the commercial club 
needed to hear. They gave McRae
virtualy free reign over the community. How the Sheriffs Department 
funded this campaign
warrants tnore research but it seems likely that McRae was frrnded by 
the Commercial Club' The
l0cal industrialists David cl0uglu Roland Hartley and williamButler, 
as well as James McChesney,
the representative from the Great Northerru still had enough power 
and influence to override the
City Commissioners and discourage any attempt to limit their 
gross abuse of power'
McRae,s offensive was only sta]led by the presence of mediator 
sent in by the federal
government to help resolve the strike. After the mediator left on Septernber 
9ft' McRae campaign
of terror resumed. on September r lfr' days rater one of the wobblies who 
had arrived in Everett
before McRae's blockade, Harry Feinberg, convened another 
street meeting in Everett' McRae's
deputies attacked the street meeting, and in the confusion 
beat wobblies and town citizens alike'
Throughout the months ofSeptember and october, armed deputies 
patrolled the countryside around
Everett, deporting some three-to-four hundred wobblies 
flulny of whomwere migrant workers just
passing through.
The abuse ofpower by McRae and the commercial club caused 
Everett's middle class even
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greater disillusionment.o Some Everett merchants posted signs intheir businesses 
stating that they
were not members ofthe Commercial Club. Middle class fear of Wotrbly 
radicalism and over reaction
fromthe Commercial Club did not go unwarranted concerning the course 
of events. Many ofthem
feared arcpeatof the Spokane free-speech fight, unfortunately this 
free-speech fight would end in
much bloodier fashion.
Tensions escalated on October 30s, when about forty-one Wobblies 
trying to enter Everett
were met at the dock by McRae and his deputies, who were drunk, 
yet hustled the wobblies into
waiting automobiles. The IWW's were driven to a location several miles 
out of town on the route
to seattle, known as Beverly park. The deputies made two lines on either 
sides of a rail road track,
where they made the prisoners run a gauntret of swinging fists, rifle 
butts and kicks to the groin
before running across the sharp blades ofa cattle guard at the end ofthe 
gauntlet' The next day'
many of the beaten wobblies stumbled back into seattle, some walking 
the entire distance before
arrivingatthelwwhallwheretheyreportedtheirstory.
In Everett news of the beatings at Beverly park was met with scorn 
from the townspeople'
McRae had announced at a mass town meeting in september, attended 
by some ten thousand people,
that he would let the wobblies return.ar why McRae went back on 
his word is uncertain but may
very well have been the result ofurging fromDavid crough and 
other commercial club members'
A committee of concerned citizens clergy and labor leaders decided to 
hold a mass meeting on
November 5e where the facts of the event could be disclosed 
to the public. on notification of this
public meeting, the IWW in seattle planned to attend the event. It notified the 
Seattle press of its
intentions and sent a circular through all of the regional and 
local branches of the Iww' The night
before the IWW secured passage for about two hundred and fifty 
passengers aboard the steamer
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Verona,and another ffiy aboard the Calista'a2
On the eve ofthe illassacre Everett was a polarized town. The striking mill 
workers and other
working class people joined with middle class citizens in their disgust at the 
cornn-rercial club and
McRae. The strategy brutality backfired on the industrialists but they continued 
on the same course'
on the evening of November 4tr, tluee hundred deputies composed of lurnber mill 
managers, and
vigilantes met at the commercial club to receive a last minute briefing 
from McRae and patriotic
speeches from mill owners like Clough'43
The events ofthe last six months finally erupted in full scale violence that 
know one probably
predicted. On November 5tr, the Verona steamed into Everett and landed at the 
city dock while
spectators watched fromthe cliffs surrounding the port. McRae had 
placed deputies in a warehouse
over looking the dock in tug boats and wharfoffices, as well as a detachment 
next to him on the dock
itself.s When the men aboard the Veronatried to get offthe boat, McRae with 
a deputy on one side
ofhim and a represerfative of the commercial club on the other side, 
asked the wobblies who their
leader was, one of them responded "'we're all leaders." when McRae told 
the men that they could
not land in Everett another wobbly shouted, 
*The hell we can't." Shooting then broke out, killing
the two men standing by McRae and injuring twenty some deputies including 
McRae.as Five
wobblies were killed and another thirty-one were injured; however, 
once the shooting broke out the
men aboard ran to the opposite side of the boat causing it to tilt severely. 
Many of the passengers
believed that several other wobblies drown after slipping offthe blood-covered 
deck' The captairu
under the direction of an Iww passenger, immediately puled away from the dock and 
headed out
into the Puget Sound.6
After the shooting subsided and the Verona steamed back to Seattle, the atmosphere 
in
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Everett remained verytense. Many ofthe townspeople blamed McRae and the commercial 
club for
the violence and others stated openry to that they hoped the IWW would come back to 
Everett and
.tlean up the town.,,47 Everett's mayor tried to sffi blame to the Commercial Club and Donald
McRae in attempt to disassociate himself with the violence and the abuse of 
power. Washington's
Governor Lister responded by sending the National Guard to Everett. one of the companies
composing the force in Everett was a company composed partly ofCentralia Guardsmen 
that had just
arrived back from patrolling the Mexican border.as Some of these centralia 
Guardsmen carried a
grudge and a disdain for the Iww after their duty in Everett. Lister also authorized the Adjutant
General Maurice Thompson to implement powers amounting to marshal law in Everett.ae 
Town
clergy pleaded with the officials from the Shingle weavers' union to call offthe strike, 
which they
did, temporarily. When the Veronaand the Calista,which had turned around 
before ever reaching
Everett, arrived back in Seattle, the authorities were waiting at the dock to arrest 
the Wobblies'
charging seventy-four of them with fust degree murder'
Regionally and in Seattle the labor movement reacted to events in Everett by 
supporting the
Iww. The seattle central Labor council set aside funds and worked with the Iww to support the
General Defense committee. Even Seattle's Mayor Gill sharply criticized the 
local authorities in
Everett and showed open sympathy for the Iww by sending blankets and tobacco to the wobblies
in jail. The General Defense committee hired Fred H. Moore, a famous labor attorney 
and George
Vanderveer as defense counsels. Moore was successflrl in getting a change 
in venue for the trial to
King county. when the triat finally began in March lglT,the prosecution decided 
to try each ofthe
prisoners separately, and chose to bring forward Thomas Tracy first because they 
thought they had
the greatest chance of convicting him'50
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The states case hinged on showing the criminal intent and the violent reputation ofthe IWW,
as well as demonstrating Tracy's guilt. Moore and Vanderveer successfully refuted the prosecutions
claims that the IWW advocated violence demonstrating instead that throughout the free-speech fight
the IWW advocated moderation and nonviolence. Conversely, the testimony ofthe defense witnesses
on the role of the Commercial Club during the whole affair held up to the prosecution's rigorous
cross examinations. The jury found Tracy not guilty, and the state subsequently, dropped charges
against the rest ofthe prisoners.5l As David Botting noted, "The unique aspect of the entire chain
of odd circumstances was that those [WW], accused got a change of venue and a just tial.u5z
The 1917 Lumber Strike the Seattle General Strike of 1919: Conditioning for the Centralia
Armistice Day bagedY.
The notoriety ofthe Everett Massacre bolstered the reputation ofthe IWW in the minds of
many lumber workers, something the union desperately needed for its organizing campaign of loggers
n lgl7. Encouraged by their earlier success in organizing agricultural workers, the IWW now
launched a drive to organize lumber workers in the Pacific Northwest. In early Marctu 1917, a
group of IWW leaders met in Spokane to form the Lumber Workers Industrial Union no. 500.53 By
early 1917, the IWW had built membership in the Lumber Workers Industrial Union to 3,000
outnumbering the WSFL unions, who had organized 2,50A members.Y The IWW found most of its
membership in the lumber industry in the logging camps, while the WSFL was much more successful
in organizing mill workers. The International Union of Tirnber Workers didn't appeal to the workers
inthe camps like the IWW did. The reasons for this are complicated, but a discussion ofthe related,
much broader question of class and job consciousness will explain these discrepancies. At this level,
loggers tended to be low wage workers, sometimes foreign born and migratory in their work 
patterns'
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Mill workerso on the other hand, contained some workers 
with a higher level of skill, and the mill
workforce tended to include fewer recent immigrants than 
the rogging camps. They were
consequently,generallymorecenteredonaparticularcommunity'Inotherwords'thewobblies
tended to be less job consciousthanthe wsFL, (and the 
AFL at the national level') The WSFL' for
example, used strikes and collective bargaining 
to improve conditions on the job' but the IWW
viewed this style oforg anumgas backward. They 
favored instead, what a long time IWW oryamzer
JamesRowan,described;"Thisorganizat\onrepresentedbythelndustrialWorkersoftheWorld'
which is patterned after the structure of modern 
industry and the organization of the capitalists 
who
control industry."55
The wSFL/AFL and the IWW frequently exchanged 
generarized insults and criticisms that
didn,t always meas're up. The Iww,s craims that the 
*'FL/AFL was craft oriented and lacked
crass consciousness omits the severar facts. At 
the state and national level wSFL/AFL championed
class regisration like the eight-hour day and a 
workers compensation system. There was also 
a
substantiar effort made by certain factions 
within the AFL to permit and organize industrial 
unions
like the uMwA, which stood out as the great AFL 
industrial union. Albeit many of their other
attempts at organanng industrial unions weren,t as successful. 
Conversely, the WSFL/AFL
gererahzations that the IWW was a destructive and 
thoroughly revorutionary organization,
unconcerned and unabre to meet the immediate 
concefl]s of workers leaves out instances where 
the
Iwwwassuccessfulinimprovingconditionsattheworksite.ofterlthelWWorganizedworkers
who were difficult to organize; itinerant and unskilled 
workers. The WSFL/AFL and the IWW held
important ideologicar differences, but both attempted 
to modify their structure and organizing style
tocopewiththechangesmadeattheworksitebyindustrialization.
2l
In the Spring of l9l7 ,conditions in the logging camps ofthe Pacific Northwest were ripe for
organizing. Terrible unsanitary living conditions in the camps where loggers were cratnped 
into small
shacks and weren,t given enough living supplies like blankets, the high rate of injuries on the 
job that
were becoming more frequent because of the productions speed up to meet war demand, and 
low
wages that weren,t keeping up with inflation all contributed to discontent among loggers in the
camps.56 Class consciousness like that that had developed in Everett in 1916, was at a fever 
pitch in
the pacific Northwest. IWW plans for a lurnber strike for the inland region ofthe Pacific 
Northwest
later in the s1;1nmer of l9l7 were moved up when a wildcat strike erupted in Northem Idaho in the
early summer. The IWWtook its chances and decided it would be better to go along withthe 
wildcat
strike and move up their strike date for the inland region to June 20m. Their strike 
demands included
an eigtrt hour day, a minimum wage of $60 per montlr, better food and dining conditions, 
sanitary
living conditions, and that aI hiring be done through the union.57 How many workers walked 
out is
dfficult to determine. A low estimate is 600, but the Iww estimated far more workers were
involved, regardless, they shut down intand lurnber operations.5E WSFL affiliated 
locals of the
Shingle Weavers, and the International Union ofTimber Workers saw the need to support 
the strike
if they were to retain credibility. on July 15ft they joined the inland lurnber strike with 
the Iww,
using demands that basically echoed the IWW, with the exception of union recognition'5e
By early fall, however, the strike had failed for a number ofreasons. Employers organized
immediately to break the strike. They organized the Lumbermen's Protective Association 
in which
mernbersagreedto fine anymember $500.00 per daythat they operated lessthantenhoursper 
shift'60
The employers and the media began to spread rumors that the strike was organized 
by the German's
to thwart that Allied/American war effort. Compounding the IWW's problems, by late 
July, they
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were faced with having to support the Shingle Weavers' and the Timber Workers 
strike in the west'
which extended the original strike beyond their capabilities. As 
public opinion due to newspaper
editoriars and other sources further deteriorated the image of the lww, the IWW struggled 
to
maintain the strike even though they cut production to 40 percent in July. 
By September, strike
leader James Rowan was in jail and the Iww sent its members back to work but to 'strike 
on the
job,, miscalculating tlnt aslow down and poor quality of work would hinder production' 
The
public,s perception of IWW suffered a serious injury because of the strike and 
the image that
employers and the governflent painted for thern
In Seattle the war, the influx of foreign born members, and wage rates 
that lagged behind
inflation rates helped radicabzethe central Labor council. At the state 
level, the wSFL was largely
under the control of the more cautious and conservative craft unionists 
after Ernest Marsh's
resignation in I g 1 g. The Metal rrades council that represented 
shipyard construction workers in the
Seattle Central Labor Council (SCLC) were among the more radical 
and militant, PartlY because of
the high mju.y rate and row wages d,ring the war. The decision ofthe 
National war Labor Board
not to grant a wage adjustment to the shipyard workers in october 
of I 9 r 8, hit especially hard. The
Metat rrades council voted to strike on January zr'n rgrg. on the z2"d 
the Metal rrades sent a
referendum asking for a sym:pathy strike vote to the sclc which approved it and sent 
it on to all
affiliated locals. onthe 2gft, almost allofthe localunions inthe scLC 
votedto strike.6r This event
marked a long process of radicalization in the scl.c and the Metal Trades council 
that began in the
mid 19r0s. The SCLC had shownopen sympathywiththe wobblies 
inEverett in 1916 and in 1917
the shipyard workers struck in sympathy the lurnber workers. 
Now under the back&op of the
Bolshevik Revolution and Bolshevik hysteria created by the 
government and business' the scLC
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made a bold move. The strike was short and peaceful. Only planned for a short duration, the strike
began on February 6ft and ended with a temporary truce by the SCLC on February 9fr. The SCLC
probablythoughttheycouldnotmaintainalong strike aswellasthe intentwas support and sympathy
for the Metal Trades Cormcil. The AFL was embarrassed by this strike that ended in none of 
the
concessions demanded by the Metal Trades Council being granted. The Navy retaliated by
abandoning ship construction in the Pacific Northwest, and employers reacted harshly 
with a new
anti-radical platform from which to launch an open shop drive. The president ofthe WSFL, 
William
Short, blamed the radical faction in the Metal Trades and the SCLC, which was composed 
of
Socialists, militant industrial unionists and dual card carrying IWW members, for the strike' This
move gave support to the conservatives inthe trade unions who had lost power earlier. 
Inthe short
terrn, opened a wedge between the SCLC and the WSFL, hindering the development 
and execution
of a strategy to combat the open shop drive. It also created an even greater rift between radicals 
and
the IWW which had supported the general strike, and conservatives trade unionists 
who were hoping
to regain lost Power.
Seattle Mayor Ole Hanson cleverly stole middle class sympathy from the SCLC during 
the
strike by equating it with radicalism and bolshevism playng on the fears of the middle 
class created
by the Bolshevik Revolution. rn :-92a ole Hanson produced a book called Americanism Versus
Bolshevism, and in it Hanson crudely and inaccurately described bolshevism and "IW.Wism"' 
He
claimed that the only solution to this problem was "Americanism and Americantzation, 
selective
immigration, education and educators, private rights, social legislatioq deportation 
of aliens,
punishment of citizens and universal service''{2
Hanson,s reign as Seattle mayor coincided with a reign of terror by the state and federal
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govemment against the IWW. During the war, the federal government used the sedition 
Act and the
Immigration Act af l9l7 to raid Iww halls and arrest and detain wobblies throughout the 
country'
After the war ended the campaign did not end. Several states, including Washinglo4 
oregon, and
Idaho passed criminal syndicalism laws that made certain Iww activities illegal-63 The state and
federal government used these new raws as well as the Espionage Act and 
Immigration Act of 1918
to intimidate and harass wobblies tluoughout Washington with hearty support 
relatively few
objections fromthe middte class. These raids had the effect of demobilizing 
the IWW. Union leaders
were diverted from organizing so they courd attend to the legar defense 
of prisoners.e In the midst
ofthis national campaign against the IWW, wobblies in washington state 
opened another branch hall
in Centralia, Washinglon the Summer of 1917'
The Centralia Disaster and the end of the IWW'
Centralia, like many small communities, was highly influenced by the 
crescendo ofanti-radical
hysteria during the 1917 rumber strike and the seattle generar strike. containing 
about 10,000
people, Centralia was a well ordered community, containing fiumy elements 
that illustrated its class
stratification such as fraternal oryanizations, business clubs and a Trades 
council' Many of
centralia,s yo,og men and women were involved in one branch of the service 
or the Red cross
during the First world war creating an ideal location for an American 
Legion Post' Fraternal middle
class organizations like the Benevolent 
protective order ofElks fostered bitterness over perceptions
oflabor radicalisrn Status differences betweenthe middle class 
lawyers, doctors, and smallbusiness
owners and the industrial capitalists were shaded by marriage 
ties and other relations between families
aswellasthe closeness asmalltownbrings. Centraliawentthrough 
some progressive reforms inearly
years, such as the adoption of the commissioner form of government, 
but the atmosphere of class
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cooperation did not exist. Two of the town's largest capitalists, Francis Hubbard of the 
Eastern
Railway and Lumber company and H.H. Martin were related through marriage.6t 
This interlocking
of business interests through marriage is one example of the formation of a 
tight nit local capitalist
class in Centralia.
The working class community ofCentralia was divided into two sections: indiginant 
workers,
including saw mill workers, coal miners, trades workers and railroad workers 
including the skilled
workers; and migratory workers, mostly including loggers, agricultural workers 
and other workers
perceived as external to the community. Middle and upper class citizens especially 
disliked migratory
workers because oftheir tendency to loiter in town when they were between 
jobs. The upper crust
disdainfirlly called the loggers'timber beasts'"66
The IWW had a relatively insignificant, but troubled history in Centralia that dates 
back to
lgl4,when a Wobbly who was trying to organize electrical workers was kicked out 
of town by the
county sheriff.67 In early February of 1915, during a strike at the Eastern Railway and 
Lurnber
Company, the sheriffwith a posse of deputized citizens, confronted a 
group of \I/obblies from out
of town and expelled them from the community, claiming that they were enforcing 
a no-vagrancy
ordinance. Many of the middle-class townspeople regarded the IWW with contempt' 
Labor
organuations, like the central rrades council, fearing persecution themselves' 
tried to separate
themselves from early Iww actions, like the 1912 Grays Harbor Strike.68 Editorials from local
newspapers like the centralia chronicle sptead rumors about the IWW' Sources like these
encouraged townspeople to view the IWW and radicalism as an external force 
that had caused
problems outside centralia. Relatively recent events like the Everett nulssacre, the 
7917 lurnber
strike, and the Seattle general strike during the winter of 1919, created a 
sense oflabor upheaval that
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feverently anti-union capitalists like Hubbard certainly did not want, and 
that alarmed middle class
citizens and angered returning veterans'
Rampant patriotismduring the war fueled incidents in and around Centralia. 
Lewis County
had long been a county of farm organizing as far back as the 1880s' During 
World War I town
residents in winlock, a smalr town eighteen miles to the south of centralia, 
expelled two farm
organizers ofthe Non-partisan League, A. Knutson and R.w. Edwards.6e 
In centralia itseE the town
newspapers bolstered the war effort with ads for liberty bonds and appears 
to conserve resources.
centralia teachers also required asked to sign loyalty oaths. one teacher, 
a young lawyer named
Elmer smith, refused to take the oath during the war because ofhis convictions 
against this style of
enforced Patriotisrn 
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violence in the name of patriotism was revived in centralia on May, 
1 8, 191 8, during a Red
cross parade, when the IWW was forcibly evicted and their hall raided. 
The wobblies were herded
into a truck and driven out oftown while a mob ofpeople including James 
churchill, owner ofa local
glove factory, and Francis Hubbard burned some ofthe hall's belongings 
inthe street and auctioned
offmore valuable items such as a desk and a phonograph.'r A 
few wgeks later a handicapped man
named rom Lassiter was se[ing copies of the Industrial worker, and 
the sea ttle union Record alortg
with other newspapers, when he was threatened, kidnaped then dumped 
in a ditch out oftown' when
Elmer smith, who practiced labor law and defended workers 
in civil cases against their employers,
came to Lassiter,s defense, he was outraged that the District Attorney 
refused to press charges on
the perpetrators.
Divisions in the town were visible with the occrurence oftwo separate events 
on Labor Day
of I 91 9. At the first event, centralia citizens heard warren o. Grimr& 
a young corporate lawyer and
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friend of Elmer Smitl1, had just returned from the war in Europe and a tour of duty 
in Siberia as part
of the American Expeditionary Force sent in to try and help the Whites overthrow 
the Bolsheviks,
speak on the dangers of bolshevisnr- At another event hosted by the Triple Alliance, a 
political
coalition of the wsFL, the Non-partisan League, the Grange and the Railroad Brotherhoods, 
five
thousand people showed up to hear labor and political speeches. Eltner Smith 
parents were farmers
and populist activists back in his child hood home in North Dakota. His backgpund 
of agrarian
radicalism and working class credentials helped himinhis electionto president ofthe 
Lewis County
Chapter of the Triple Alliance.72 Across town on Tower St. a Wobbly named 
Britt Smith made
arrangements with the owners of the Roderick Hotel to rent part of the downstairs 
of the hotel for
a hall.73
The presence of the Iww hall spawned a deep hatred among numy of the Centralians who
had formed the Centralia Citizens Protective Association (CCPA) back in June 
of the same year'
SheriffJohn Berry attempted to get permission from prosecuting attorney 
H. Allen to evict the Iww,
but Allen declined, stating that the Wobblies had done nothing illegal yet' Angered by this
development, Hubbard and other angry businessmen called for a meeting 
of the CCPA on October
20h atthe Elks hall to discuss how to get the IWw out of Centralia. At the meeting, Berry, 
Allen,
and chief of police A.C. Hughes explained that they courd not remove the 
IWW on legal grounds.
Hubbard objected statmg that 
..ifhe were the police chief, the wobblies would be gotten rid of soon
enough.,,7a After the meeting plans were made by the CCPA to investigate 
drafting a town ordinance
that would allow for the removal of the wobblies as well as exploration 
of extralegal methods of
removal. It's not clear if there was any follow up of the ordinance, but CCPA and 
the American
Legion made plans almost immediately to attack the IWW hall during the 
veteran's Day parade'
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Why the county and municipal authorities declined to evict the IWW especially considering
the campaign being waged against the union throughout the state is unclear. Perhaps they wanted
to see a vigilante solution to the problem. Whatever the case, the crty government and the police
chief did little to head offthe vigilante justice already formulating. When mmors of the impending
attack on the hall began to circulate around town the IWW and the owners of the Roderick Hotel
McAllisters, pleaded tlre police for protection but they were turned down. Britt Smith and the
Wobblies attempted another tactic, they printed and circulated a leaflet appealing to Centralians to
come to their aid, but the leaflet tumed up no encouraging responses. In earlyNovember, 
Britt Smith
went to see Elmer Smith to seek legal advice. Elmer assured Britt that ifthe hall was attacked that
the Wobblies were legally entitled to defend the hall ifthey were attacked first, but Elmer apparently
didn,t go beyond the basic e4planation of selfdefense and didn't counsel Britt on any other options.T5
On November 7fr the Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration Service of the Labor
Department stepped up raids in twelve US cities and arresting hundreds of so-called radical
immigrants nationwide. In Centralia two days later, a meeting was held at the IWW hall to discuss
what to do ifthe hall was raided. Most ofthe Wobblies in the hall were just passing by and had 
liule
knowledge or background of the situation in centralia. one of the Wobblies by the name wesley
Everest, an anny veteran who served in the Spruce Production Division, argued that the 
IWW's
should defend the hall with force. Britt Smith was his closest supporter but he was not able 
the rest
of the wobblies to reach a consensus on a course of action. Some of them wbre opposed 
to using
guns to defend the hall while others were adamant onthis point. The only thing they agreed on 
was
that no one would open fire unless the hall was attacked'76
on the morning of November l ls, Elmer smith visited the hall and confirmed with Britt
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Smith that the IWW would defend the hall if they were attacked, Britt who busy making final plans
and making sure that everyone who wanted a firearm had one. Tom Copeland in lttsbook The
Centralia Tragedy of 1919, crrticized Smith for not advising Britt not to use violence and for not
being clear with him on the use of guns to defend the hall.77 Whatever his reasoning, it seems that
Smith made an error in judgement by not being explicitly clear on the matter of what constitutes self
defense. Britt Smith stationed two Wobblies, O.C. Bland and John Larnb in the Arnold Hotel just
north ofthe hall on Tower Ave., placed three Wobblies, Loren Roberts, Ole Hanson, and Bert Bland
on Seminary hill which was approximately fifteen hundred feet due east ofthe hall and finally Wesley
Everest, Bert Faulkner, Mike Sheehan, James Mclnerney, Ray Becker, Tom Morgan and himself
inside the hall to await the raid.78 Apparently another Wobbly whose name is not known set up in
Bert Bland's room of the Avalon Hotel on Tower Ave. just to the south.
The IWW's beliefthat the American Legion and the CCPA was conspiring against them were
proven by a bloody disaster on Armistice Day. On the afternoon of the 1ln, the Veteran's Day
parademade it downTower Ave., withthe AmericanLegioncontingent intheremoftheprocession.
First the Legionnaires marched passed then formed a line directly in front of hall before beginning
their charge. Whenthe Legionnaires reached the hall, they busted out the window and broke down
the door after they entered gun shots were fired. It has never been exactly determined ifthe Wobblies
stationed outside the hall fired on the Legionnaires as well. When the firing subsided, Arthur
McElfrestr, Warren Grimm and Ben Cassagranda were all mortally wounded and died later that day.
Most of the Wobblies tried to escape, the Legionnaires caught Britt Smith, Ray Becker, Mike
Sheehan, James Mclnerney, Tom Morgan and Bert Faulkner. Wesley Everest made it out of the hall
but was pursued by Legionnaires. One of thenU Dale Hutrbard had almost caught up to him when
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Everest started to wade across the river, he then turned and told Hubbard that he would only
surrender to the police, Hubbard made one last move forward to get him when Everest shot and 
killed
him. Several other Legionnaires behind Hubbard caught Everest, beat hirn, then threw him in 
jail
with the other Wobblies.
The police did very little to restore order. Instead the Legionnaires took control of the
streets, patrolling and raiding pool halls looking for other suspects. They arrested anyone 
belonging
to the Iww or suspected of belonging to the IWW. In addition, they arrested Elmer Smith and his
brothers.
Altogether, the Legionnairesthrewtwenty-two people injail. One ofthese twenty-two was
Eugene Barnett, a coal miner and United Mine Workers (JMWA) member and IWW sympathizer,
who had been out on strike for the 1919 LIMWA nationwide strike. Barnett had been in town 
that
day visiting the McAllisters at the Roderick Hotel. Barnett claimed in an interview in I 941 
that when
he was arrested the prosecuting attorney told him that he knew that Barnett only witnessed 
the
tragedy and had nothing to do with it, but if he spoke up about the incident they 
would throw him
in with the rest ofthe Wobblies, Barnett declined their offer because ofhis higher ideals 
that opposed
vigilantism.Te At Z:30 on the same night as the affair, the street lamps were turned ofi and
legionnaires told motorists to turn off their headliglrts. A group of Legionnaires and Elks then
marched over to the jail where the prisoners were being held. They took Wesley Everest, 
who
apparently they had mistaken for Britt Smith, to the Chehalis bridge were he was hung. 
Afterwards,
the lynch mob took pot shots at Everest's dangling body. The body remained there until 
the next day
when it was taken down, and when no undertaker would accept the body, they threw 
Everest's body
back into the cell with the prisoners. A coroner examined the body on November 13e and 
the
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findings concurred that Everest had been lynched'
Governor Hart responded to the Veteran's Day events in Centralia by sending out the
National Guard to restore order and prevent any mole lynchings. Hart also appealed to 
President
Wilson to deport alien IWW leaders. Regionally, authorities all over the Pacific Northwest 
escalated
their crackdown on the IWW with raids on halls in seattle, Aberdeen, Yakim4 Tacoma, 
Spokane and
portland. State Attomey General L.L. Thompson advised prosecutors in thirty-nine ofWashington's
counties to rush the IWW cases through in mass trials, not giving Wobblies ample to 
time to get legal
defense.m
The American Legion closed ranks quickly over the Centralia affair. One of the few
legionnairesthat didn't conformwasEdwardBasset, commanderoftheButte, 
MontanalegionPost'
He condemned the mob attack on the hall and stated, 
*The fact that there were some American
Legion men among the paraders who everlastingly disgraced themselves by taking 
part in the raid,
does not effect my judgement in the reast."8r The oregonian rcported onNovember 
13n, that the
centralia American Legion post received sympathetic letters from all over 
the country but especially
from Legion posts in the pacific Northwest including Portland. The oregonian 
also reported a few
other things ofinterest onthe 1lfr. illinois Governor Lowden, praised the centralia 
Legionnaires at
a reunion picnic of the second Army Division. pacific Northwest congressmen criticized 
and
blamed the federal government for being to lenient on radicalism arguing 
that the government that
was to blame. Representative Branton of Texas argued that the Centralia 
tragedy was an example
of why the rail road bill under debate on the House floor should have a 
no strike clause'82
The labor movement was divided over the Centralia affair. The Portland central 
Labor
Council on the 21,1resolved to condemn the shootings in centralia, 
characterizing the raiders as law
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abiding citizens and blaming the IWW for the whole tragic event.s The seattle 
central Labor
Council also condemned the action but later would take another approach 
by sending delegates to
the trial to decide whether the wobbries were guilty or innocent. In centralia, 
Local 694 of the
International Typographical Union adopted a resolution on December 
15tr opposing the publication
of the seattle (Jnion Record,perhaps because they thought it was too sympathetic 
with the IWW'
and calling for the expulsion of the radicar elements from the raoks of 
union latror.M rhe local's
action was endorsed by its international union. The decision by the local 
not to publish the union
Recordwas important and symbolic, because the labor paper was 
really the only method where the
wobbliessideofthestorymighthavereachedouttoabroaderaudience' 
Infact,theunionRecord's
printing machinery, records, unopened mail including personal mail of the staff 
at its Seattle
headquarters, was confiscated by the U.S. District Attorney's Office' 
The District Attorney claimed
that an editorial written by the (Jnion Record, somehow violated 
the sedition provision ofthe wartime
act.ss with no voice to give their side of the story, public opinion of the Iww and 
the prisoners
deteriorated even more.
The Iww's General Defense committee secured a well known defense attorney' 
George
Vanderveer, for the defense ofthe twelve Wobblies including 
Barnett, (two ofthe Wobblies charged
were never found) who were charged with fust degree murder 
of wamen Grimm and Elmer Smith
with accessory to murder. The prosecution decided to concentrate 
on Grimrn, because they felt that
they had the best chance to prove that he was not in the ha]l 
when he was shot. vanderveer sent his
law partner, Ra$h Pierce from seattle to Centralia" while he finished 
up some work' Pierce was
successful in winning a change in venue to Montesano. After 
Vanderveer arrived to take over the
case, however, he realized that Montesano was not much better 
than centralia' and tried
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unsuccessfully to win another change of venue.
The trial opened on January 26,lgz}with a heavy turnout of legionnaires recruited and paid
to attend the trial. The Seattle Central Labor Council also sent a labor jury. The prosecution
attempted to illustrate, through forensics and witnesses that Grimms wound had to have been inflicted
by a gunmen while he was outside the hall. Despite testimony from witnesses that placed Grimm
inside the hall when he was shot and where he then stumbled out into the street, along with the
admission ofFrank Bickford, who had marched with the Legionnaires, that the doors ofthe hall were
forced open before a shot was ever fired, the jury reluctantly ruled that Grimm had was killed by fire
from the Avalon Hotel, (the location ofthe unknown Wobbly.)E6 While Smith, Sheehan and Roberts
was acquitted, seven of the defendants, Barnett, Bert and O.C. Bland, Britt SmitlL Becker and
Mclnerney, were found guilty ofsecond degree murder. The likelihood that the 
jury felt pressure to
convict the Wobblies was high considering the strong Legionnaire presence and the hardline
instructions from the judge. In later years, twelve members offthe jury renounced the guilty verdict.8T
Incidentally the labor jury found the defendants not guilty'
Communities in Comparison: Everett 1916, and Centralia 1919.
One historiag Donald Macphee accurately stated, "The local and regional setting of the
Centralia dispute gave it much of its distinctive neofrontier flavor; but the rhetoric and passion,
especially ofthe legionnaires and their supporters, were drawn &om the nationwide crusade against
radicalism.,:s8 ffts Centra]ia tragedy effectively finished the IWW in the Pacific Northwest. Never,
since then, has the union been able to launch a strike in the region like it did in I 91 7. However, it is
important that we note the differences between the Everett and the Centralia tragedy one last 
time'
While class conflict was present in both communities, antagonisms played out differently. 
In Everett
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the middle class, which was never quite hegemonized by the industrial capitalists, came out against
the violence ofthe McRae and the Commercial Club. In Centralia, the middle class legionnaires and
businessmen were the main contributors ofthe violence, albeit they were probably working with the
direction of capitalists like Francis Hubbard.
The working class also reacted differently to the plight of the IWW in both towns. The
Everett labor movement quickly rallied with the Wobblies, who had supported their struggle to
oppose McRae and the Commercial Club. In Centralia the situation was the opposite, the Central
Trades Council and much of the regional labor movement condemned the tragedy and distanced
themselves from the IWW. The choice of tactics by the IWW in Centralia in 1919 were also
dramatically different from the non-violent civil disobedience the IWW practiced in Everett in I 91 6.
perhaps the experience of the Everett tragedy and the l9l7 lumber strike dulled the IWW's
willingness to engage in a non-violent free-speech fight. The IWW's expulsion from Centralia on
previous occasions and Elmer Smith's advice, may have been the major reasons why vigilante
violence broke out in Centralia on this scale rather than some other Pacific Northwest town. All of
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